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Abstract 
This paper deals with the impact of the $/€ exchange rate on German exports in 
the period from 1995Q1 to 2008Q4. Our main aim is to identify „pain thresholds” 
for German exporters. We rely on a non-linear model according to which 
suddenly strong spurts of exports occur when changes of the EXR go beyond a 
kind of “play” area (analogous to a mechanical play). We implement an 
algorithm describing play-hysteresis into a regression framework. A unique 
“pain threshold” of the $/€ exchange rate does not exist, since the borders of 
the play area and, thus, also the „pain threshold“ (as the upper border) depend 
on the historical path of the whole process. We come up with an estimate of a 
play area width of 24 US dollar cent per euro. At the end of our estimation 
period, the previous exchange rate movements had shifted the upper bound of 
the play area to about 1.55 US dollar per euro. In our interpretation, this is the 
current “pain threshold”, where a strong spurt reaction of exports to a further 
appreciation of the euro is expected to start. 
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When Does It Hurt? 
The Exchange Rate “Pain Threshold” for German Exports 
 
 
“ I ’m not worried about a strong euro. I  love a strong euro” –  
(Peer Steinbrück, former German finance minister, July 2007) 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
European politicians and business persons are frequently concerned with the 
European currency. A leading pan-European business lobby said recently that the 
euro has reached its „pain threshold“ and that the currency should be re-evaluated at 
the G7 meeting upcoming in autumn 2007. More concretely, it was BusinessEurope 
President Ernest-Antoine Seilliere who said to Jean-Claude Juncker, the chairman of 
Eurogroup, that he also agreed that the euro exchange rate had reached a „pain 
threshold“ for European companies" (Dow Jones International News 2007).
1
 Such 
kind of statements implicitly address the $/€ exchange rate still is one of the most 
closely watched exchange rates in the world, much as the dollar/DM rate was in the 
past. Its gyrations, which are at times difficult to understand on purely economic 
grounds, are often perceived to be politically costly and, hence, closely observed and 
commented by analysts, business lobbies and governments (as, e.g. within the G-
20). 
Nevertheless, falling in love with a strong currency does not appear to be unusual for 
Germans. However, many would expect Peer Steinbrueck’s fling (cited above) to be 
nasty, brutish and short (Munchau 2007). Since his statement in July 2007, the 
euro’s exchange rate has risen even further (seeFigure 1). In autumn 2007, it was 
assumed that if the euro continued to appreciate, Germany in particular would suffer 
from a sustained exchange-rate overshooting, as its economy remains as dependent 
                                            
1
 "The exchange rate is a worry because we have gotten to the highest level of the euro 
since its creation," BusinessEurope President Ernest-Antoine Seilliere told a news 
conference. Seilliere said companies welcomed the ECB's decision to keep interest 
rates on hold on September 11, 2007, and praised the bank's actions over the summer 
of 2007, when it injected liquidity into the money market to keep it functioning amid a 
global credit crunch. 
But BusinessEurope noted that the ECB had suggested it was only postponing a further 
rate rise. "Diverging monetary policies across the Atlantic have never been seen since 
the launch of the euro and could cause exchange rate volatility and an even more 
significant appreciation of the euro vis-à-vis the dollar and other currencies," it said. 
Seillière called on EU member states to intervene. In his words, “the euro cannot be a 
variable adjusting to reductions in the US foreign deficit” (Strupczewski 2007). 
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as ever on a successful export sector. Even though the Germans tend to have a 
slightly higher exchange rate “pain threshold“ than the French (because their exports 
are not as price sensitive as the French ones), Germany was nevertheless said to be 
not too far away from that threshold at that time. The question was raised what 
happened if the euro would rise above $1.40. Germany’s ability to improve its 
competitive position through a devaluation of the real exchange rate had run its 
course in autumn 2007. With unemployment down sharply, conditions in the labor 
market were gradually returning to normal. The latest wage settlements and reports 
of capacity shortages at that time were a clear indication that Germany’s competitive 
adjustment process had been completed. Hence, once the euro hits $1.45, the guess 
was that it would be too strong even for Mr Steinbrueck’s taste because it would 
endanger Germany’s improvements in competitiveness (Munchau 2007). But at what 
level at all does the external value of the euro hit its „pain threshold“, for instance, 
vis-à-vis the dollar? 
Figure 1 – $/€ exchange rate and German exports to the US 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: own calculation based on time series from Eurostat, WM/Reuters and OECD. 
In order to clarify issues in this respect, the paper proceeds as follows. In section 2, 
we motivate why it makes sense to investigate the question of a “pain threshold” 
exchange rate and give a brief historical overview of such claims referring to the $/€ 
exchange rate. In section 3, we derive a simple model which serves to capture the 
non-linear hysteresis-type dynamics inherent in the relation between the exchange 
rate and exports. Taking this model as a starting point, we develop an algorithm 
describing play-hysteresis and implement it into a regression framework in section 4. 
In section 5, we estimate the exchange rate impacts on German exports to the US, 
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regression we come up with an estimate of Germany’s current “pain threshold” of the 
$/€ exchange rate. Section 6 concludes. 
 
2. THREE EPISODES OF $/€ EXCHANGE RATE “PAIN THRESHOLDS” 
AND THEIR MAIN LESSONS 
But at what level at all does the euro hit its „pain threshold“, for instance, vis-à-vis the 
dollar? A closer look into the more recent episodes in which the $/€ rate reached “all-
time highs” and, thus, at least local maxima might be helpful in this regard. According 
to Figure 1, the relevant periods are 2004 and somewhere in between 2007/2008 
and the more recent months in 2009. Moreover, another important stylized fact is that 
in general German exports tend to move much slower than the $/€ exchange rate. If 
exports react to movements in the exchange rate, this reaction initially tends to be 
much less than proportional. Only if exchange rate changes are one-directional and 
steady (downward in the first part and upward in the second part of the sample 
period) also exports react more significantly.  
2.1 The history of local maxima of the $/€ exchange rate 
Figure 1 reveals that for three years before May 19, 2004, the exchange rate of the 
euro against the dollar has traveled a one-way street - upwards. From the 
perspective of business, the short correction in exchange rates which was taking 
place thereafter gave German industry some breathing room at best, but did nothing 
to solve the fundamental problems of a too high exchange rate. Since reaching its 
lowest level at the end of the year 2000, it has appreciated until May 19, 2004, in 
value against the dollar by approximately 40 percent.  
From the start of 2004, the euro rushed from one all-time high to another within the 
same year. On January, 9th, the $/€ rate had mounted to 1.28 in order to take values 
of nearly 1.36 at the end of the same year (December 31st: 1.35925). Since 
November 2003, the euro had re-valued in terms of the effective trade-weighted 
exchange rate in the midst of January 2004 by around five percent while the euro has 
appreciated by even ten percent in bilateral terms vis-à-vis the dollar since December 
2003. This clear upward trend was interrupted only briefly when some members of 
the ECB council intervened verbally from January 12, 2004, on in favor of a lower 
euro (“brutal revaluation of the euro”) (ECB Observer 2004). Thus, we feel legitimized 
to call this period episode one.  
Indeed, on February 29, 2004, many central bankers still thought the present 
exchange rate was close to where it should be. In its monthly bulletin of January 
2002, the ECB published a list of more than a dozen independent estimates for the 
equilibrium exchange rate of the euro. The average came to about $1.17. Moreover, 
the exchange rate of 1.18 dollar per euro has often been called a “pain threshold” 
and a threat for German exporters closely corresponds to the starting exchange rate 
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at the birth date of European Economic and Monetary Union in 1999 (ECB Observer 
2004). The exchange rate prevailing at the end of February 2004 of around $1.25 
was thus said to be not that far off. Even though these estimates were at that time 
two years old, some ECB officials still looked to them as a rough guide. This means 
that their „pain threshold“ was significantly higher than Mr. Schroeder's or Mr 
Raffarin's at that time. For instance, Munchau’s (2004) guess was that the German 
and French governments would really start to squeal once the exchange rate hits 
$1.30 whereas the ECB could have probably lived with $1.40 or even $1.50 quite 
comfortably. In this vein, the Federal Association of German Industry and some euro 
area politicians like the Belgian finance minister Didier Reynders already assessed a 
euro exchange rate vis-à-vis the dollar of 1.20 to 1.30 as a threat and a bottom line 
for interventions (ECB Observer 2004). 
According to Figure 1, the $/€ exchange rate exceeded its 1.40 threshold and thus 
reached its next local peak not earlier than on September 20th, 2007. What is more, it 
stayed above this threshold until October, 1st, 2008. From February, 27th, until 
August, 8th, 2008, the $/€ exchange rate even reached values above a record high 
of 1.50. We would like to call this “episode two”. Accordingly, in October 2007, 
leading EU business lobbies and the European Trade Union Council (ETUC) have 
urged the European Central Bank (ECB) to give markets a clear message that the 
continuing strengthening of the euro is no longer acceptable, and that there will not 
be a rise in interest rates in the foreseeable future (Europlatform 2007).  
The background was that the euro rose to all-time highs above $1.392 in the week 
before September 17, 2007, as investors priced in the likelihood of a rate cut by the 
U.S. Federal Reserve and a potential future rate rise by the ECB. For instance, the 
employers' federation BusinessEurope said that, by crossing 1.40 against the US 
dollar (and appreciating against the Chinese yuan and Japanese yen), the euro 
exchange rate had reached a "pain threshold" for European companies (Europlatform 
2007). On 18 October 2007, the euro finally hit a new record level of 1.4310 against 
the dollar, thus breaking the previous record of 1.4283 per dollar set on 1 October 
2007. 
While France, concentrating more on the production of price-sensitive goods and 
services, at that time had repeatedly stated its concern over the effects of a 
continuously appreciating euro on the euro area's external competitiveness, 
Germany, the Netherlands and Austria seemed to be less troubled by the euro's high 
flight in autumn 2007.  
Let us first take a step back to November 10th, 2007, because what ECB President 
Trichet said was intriguing. It was more than a signal that the ECB was opposed to 
further fast euro gains. He said that recent moves had been “undoubtedly sharp and 
abrupt” and he added that “brutal moves” were never welcome. The decisive 
When Does It Hurt? The Exchange Rate “Pain Threshold” for German Exports 
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watchword here was "brutal".
2
 The use of this ECB code word clearly suggested that 
the ECB might have been going to launch a campaign of verbal intervention to 
dissuade currency speculators from pushing the euro any higher (MaBiCo 2007). 
However, as the euro approached the psychologically important $1.50 level around 
23. November 2007, German Finance Minister Peer Steinbrueck seemed to 
acknowledge that official acceptance of the moves in the foreign exchange market 
had limits. On November 21 he warned that there was a “pain threshold”, even 
though he did not (could not?) define it, adding “I’m aware of the fact that there is a 
limit”. He noted that the competitiveness of German companies ensured that the 
euro’s strength was no cause of worry, but was unable to say whether that would be 
sufficient going forward. 
The euro reached a next record high of $1.5912 on April 10, 2008, which made 
German cars (and also French champagne) more expensive for American customers 
or forced exporters to squeeze their margins.
3
 But record sales figures from Europe's 
biggest automaker Volkswagen AG showed the trend. VW said on April 10th, 2008, it 
saw its best-ever quarterly car sales in the first three months of the year 2008, 
despite the dampening effect of the exchange rate. Sales to the U.S. fell slightly, 
though that was more than offset by surging demand in China and Brazil. Trade 
figures from 2007 show that euro nations, which include France and Germany, saw 
sales to the U.S. and Japan slip slightly but increased exports to most other major 
trading partners that year. Again, there was much evidence of weak reaction of 
exports to movements of the $/€ exchange rate (see, among others, as a 
representative source from Associated Press, White 2008). 
But the debate about exchange rate “pain thresholds” for EU exports continued with 
unfettered intensity also in 2008 because companies that rely on dollar-denominated 
sales - such as Airbus - were feeling considerably more pain. For instance, Louis 
Gallois, chief executive of Airbus' parent European Aeronautic Defence & Space Co. 
warned that "we are at levels which are becoming unbearable". He argued that it 
could force the company to shift more of its costs into dollars by moving production 
outside of the euro area and making acquisitions in dollar-based countries. For 
Airbus, which sells its planes in dollars while many of its costs are in euros, each 10-
cent rise in the euro against the dollar costs 1 billion euros ($1.59 billion) (White 
2008).  
Furthermore, the euro currency zone's top official, Luxembourg Prime Minister Jean-
Claude Juncker, said on April 10th, 2008, that the strong euro had not yet hit the „pain 
threshold“ for European exporters. He did not see the strong euro hurting the 
European economy "for the time being". However, he clearly refused to say what 
                                            
2
 Also Guy Quaden, a governor of the ECB, has warned against "brutal" moves in the 
exchange rate (Evans-Pritchard 2007). 
3
 However, it also had an upside for Europe because it helps ease inflation by reducing 
the cost of dollar-priced oil imports. 
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level would hurt European exporters: "The export sector is developing quite well. The 
moment will come where the exchange rate level will start to cause serious harm to 
the European economy." (White 2008). 
This debate was clearly overshadowed in the aftermath by the recent financial and 
economic crisis. Not earlier than on July 17, 2009, it became alive again. The recent 
appreciation of the euro against the dollar is not structural and therefore not worrying, 
the chairman of euro zone finance ministers, Jean-Claude Juncker said at that time. 'I 
don't think that we are facing a strengthening - in a structural sense - of the euro, so 
recent moves are not worrying,' he told Reuters. Before, the euro had firmed to 
$1.4146 on July 9th, from $1.3830 on July 8th, and has been rising steadily from 
$1.2455 at the start of March 2009. European exporters said on the same occasion 
that the „pain threshold“ for them is an exchange rate above $1.40. However, the 
discussion even gained momentum in October 2009 when the $/€ exchange rate 
climbed to values of around 1.50 and some ECB rhetoric against a “too high rate” 
started again (Strupczewski 2009). 
2.2  Lessons from the episode of 2004: what is the significance of a strong 
euro (a weak dollar) for the German industry?  
The exchange rate question has traditionally been of great importance for German 
industry. After all, more than a third of added value was exported in 2004.
4
 In 2008, 
this share increased to around 45 percent. It is true that this high export ratio is 
moderated by the fact that Germany sent about 45 percent of its exports to the euro 
region in 2004, where exchange rates are stable.
5 
But there still remains a substantial 
proportion of German exports which is – at least potentially - sensitive to fluctuations 
of the $/€ exchange rate. The share of Germany’s exports destined for the United 
States, at 7.5 % in 2007, does not appear to be overly large. However, the exchange 
rate effect is amplified by competition with US-products on third markets and the fact 
that certain Asian emerging market economies which, in the past few years, have 
evolved into major export markets (accounting for 3.5 % of German exports at the 
last count), oriented their currencies very closely to the US dollar, at least in the past. 
Measured by a group of 19 major trading partners of Germany, the US dollar, 
                                            
4
 Own calculations based on Bundesbank data published by Thomson Reuters 
Datastream. The share of exports in gross value added was 36.7 % in 2004 (annual 
average share in current prices, seasonally adjusted). In 2008, this share amounted to 
44.67 %.  
5
 Own calculations based on Bundesbank data (annual average share in current prices, 
seasonally adjusted). In 2004, the share of German exports to the euro area in total 
German exports turned out to be 44.67 %. This value has slightly declined in 2008 to 
43.03. 
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including third-market effects, has a weight of around 15% from the point of view of 
the German economy (Deutsche Bundesbank 2008, pp. 34ff.).
6
 
Business lobby groups argued that the massive drop in Germany’s business with the 
US amounting to 10 % in 2003 proved how strongly exports react to the weakness of 
the dollar at that time. The price competitiveness of German industry had suffered 
badly in the years before 2004. German firm representatives and associations 
pushed the argument that the current euro-dollar exchange rate was at that time at 
about its long-term average and price competitiveness has to some extent remained 
unchanged fails to be convincing.  
They also argued that the frequently mentioned “pain threshold”, which is supposed 
to generally apply to a specific and unique appropriate euro-dollar rate, simply does 
not exist. This is because the “pain threshold”, to adopt this expression, differs widely 
from company to company and is also highly product dependent (von Wartenberg, 
2004). There is heterogeneity of the exchange rate threshold across firms, i.e. on the 
micro level. On the one hand, suppliers of niche products, such as in the field of 
specialized mechanical engineering or certain segments of the automobile business 
can perhaps shrug off the increase in value of the euro with comparative ease. On 
the other hand, firms with standard products which are exposed to the biting winds of 
international competition have a huge problem with a strong euro versus the dollar. 
Experience shows that when there is a sustained increase in the value of the euro 
against the dollar of around 10 percent, German exports drop – as a rule-of-thumb - 
by around 1 percent, von Wartenberg (2004) argued. In April 2004, many enterprises 
were only able to maintain their market shares by cutting prices. But there were 
limits, and the limits were visible. Above all, the main impact was felt by the sectors 
which are heavily export oriented, such as automobiles, mechanical engineering and 
pharmaceuticals.  
The situation was no better with regard to medium-sized industry in Germany, quite 
the reverse, in fact. As a rule, medium-sized firms have few opportunities to adopt 
globalized strategies to cover themselves against undesirable exchange rate risks. 
So indeed there were quite a few companies which benefited from the strength of the 
euro which went along with the weakness of the dollar as, for instance, the tourism 
industry as are naturally all those sectors which derive a cost benefit from the cheap 
dollar but have their main market in the EU and/or Germany (Wartenberg 2004). Let 
us now discuss why - quite contradictory to the anecdotic evidence cited above - 
reactions of German exports to the US to $/€ exchange rate movements tend to be 
rather weak unless a “pain” threshold is passed by the exchange rate. 
                                            
6
 Own calculations based on Bundesbank data reveal that the respective values 
amounted to 8.87 in 2004 and 7.2 in 2008. 
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2.3 Why is the reaction of German exports to small to medium-sized 
exchange rate movements so weak? 
In contrast to its counterparts in most of the other euro area member countries, the 
German export industry has at least in the short run become much less vulnerable to 
exchange rate movements in the recent years. What are the reasons of weak 
reactions of German exports to exchange rate movements?  
Hedging of exchange rate uncertainty 
In the short run, i.e. in case of an only transitory appreciation of the euro, the choice 
of the invoice currency and the extent of cross-currency hedging play a role. 
Currently, around 80 percent of German exports are invoiced in euros and only 13 
percent in US dollars. Moreover, three quarters of all foreign currency receivables 
from export business are hedged against exchange rate related losses for some time 
(Deutsche Bundesbank 2008). These exchange-traded or even tailor-made hedging 
deals are able to cushion the appreciation pressure only for a limited period. Even 
firms with a professional exchange rate management such as, for instance, Porsche, 
are hedged only for some years. Moreover, from the perspective of a single firm, 
hedging leads to additional fixed costs of exports (Deutsche Bundesbank, 2008, pp. 
35ff.).  
Many enterprises, especially most of the larger companies, have hedged their 
exchange rate risks, although as a rule only partially (around 30 to 50 %). Only a few 
companies take action to secure complete protection against foreign currency 
liabilities. In the case of most medium-sized firms, it is not usual practice to hedge 
foreign exchange risks. They simply lack experience in this field. Here the drop in the 
value of the dollar really hits home and heterogeneity of German exporting firms 
comes into the game again.  
German export product line and price elasticity of exports 
What is more, world demand of German products reacts only less than proportionally 
to a price increase since also the structure of German’s product line is behind 
Germany’s export success. The price elasticity of German exports has diminished 
markedly in recent years. Empirical studies show that, if domestic prices rise by 1% 
relative to foreign prices, real exports go down by 0.25%. This relatively small 
influence is due partly to the fact that the share of relatively price-inelastic goods in 
the range of German exports is quite high. Exports to non-euro area countries, in 
particular, respond relatively weakly to price competitiveness (Deutsche Bundesbank 
2008). 
Even more important: making up for a share of around 40% in 2007, machinery, 
equipment and vehicles dominate Germany’s industrial production. Demand of these 
capital goods has been very strong globally until the current financial and economic 
crisis has fed itself into international trade. German firms are often highly specialized 
in these areas and in terms of technology maintained their position as the world 
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market leader. As a consequence, importers are not able to or even do not want to 
switch to other suppliers even when the external value of the euro increases because 
switching costs would be too high for them. Foreign consumers are just stuck and 
“caught” in their relation to German suppliers. Even in the US, although it already 
headed into a record recession, the demand for capital goods kept quite stable until 
the late 2008 due to the sustained high corporate gains. Thereby, Germany displays 
a more balanced export profile than France with its focus on aeronautics and 
aerospace and Spain and Italy which export relatively many low tech-goods such as 
textiles and food.  
Relief on the export side by cheaper imports  
However, the current appreciation of the euro generally affects not only firms’ export 
sales but also their costs by reducing the price of the imported intermediate inputs 
that go into the manufacture of exported goods. These imported inputs latterly made 
up 45% of exports, as against 31% in 1995.  In addition, the prices of most 
commodities (including crude oil) in the world markets are quoted in US dollars. The 
appreciation-related cost relief, which has been particularly noticeable in Germany’s 
energy bills, was a key factor in ensuring that, all in all, German exporters have 
coped relatively well with the strengthening euro in the past few years.  
Adjusting intermediate inputs and outsourcing as a natural hedge  
To some degree, exporters can offset exchange rate-related losses in price 
competitiveness by adjusting their intermediate inputs. Firms can, for instance, 
transfer their business at fairly short notice to suppliers from countries whose 
currencies have depreciated against the euro or otherwise provide cost advantages 
(examples are EADS, Boehringer Ingelheim and Böwe Syntec). Medium to long-term 
strategies are aimed more at restructuring production and revising the firm’s internal 
policies for choosing production sites. In this way the share of imported intermediate 
inputs from low-cost countries can be increased at the expense of domestically 
generated value added – made more expensive by currency appreciation – or else 
manufacturing can be shifted partly to other, lower-cost countries in order to be able 
to sell the final products at competitive euro prices without any (major) losses in 
revenues (Axarloglou and Kouvelis 1999, Deutsche Bundesbank 2008). 
An important element of this strategy is “natural hedging”, which has been practised, 
for instance, by the German automotive industry (DaimlerChrysler) and its suppliers 
particularly in the past 15 years by establishing or at least envisaged (BMW) 
manufacturing capacity in the United States. This means not only that products are 
delivered to the local buyers without any exchange rate risk but that, if the euro 
appreciates, exchange rate-related losses from German exports to the USA are 
offset within the firm through exports to Europe. Such a hedge can also be achieved 
by buying equity stakes or existing manufacturing sites (Deutsche Bundesbank 
2008). 
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Sunk costs 
Recent research in international economics, employing theoretical analysis and 
assessment of firm level data clearly confirm that “sunk costs matter” (Godard, Goerg 
and Goerlich 2009). In a nutshell, this implies that setting up of global export 
networks coincides with substantial set up costs. These costs can to a large extent 
not be recouped once a firm leaves the export market or terminates its international 
customer-supplier relationships (the latter being especially significant in the German 
case of car producers which dominate German exports).  
Examples of sunk costs of exporting are thought to be mainly those of information 
gathering on the new market (costs for market research), setting up new foreign 
distribution networks, marketing and possibly repackaging of the product to appeal to 
new consumers, paying for lawyers versed in the law of the foreign country, etc. 
While setting up a global export distribution network presupposes that the respective 
firm has covered these costs and got the knowledge, the value of this knowledge 
tends to depreciate rather quickly once the firm has left the export market (Roberts 
and Tybout 1997). The literature on German firm export decisions has found 
considerable persistence in export status over time. For example, Bernard and 
Wagner (2001) test for the role of plant characteristics and sunk costs in the entry 
decision, using a panel of German manufacturing plants. They find entry and exit 
among their German sample of 2.4 percent and 2.3 percent, indicating a huge impact 
of sunk costs.  
All in all, the entry of German firms into export markets once included obtaining 
unknown information about consumption patterns and market potential, setting up 
distribution and service networks, bearing the costs of establishing a brand name 
through advertising, and bringing the foreign product into conformity with domestic 
health regulations. These costs are firm-specific and cannot be resold on exiting the 
market, at least in terms of their total value, being therefore regarded as irreversible 
or partially irreversible investments (Kannebley 2008). What is more, the great bulk of 
German firms which are willing and able to export to the US have entered the US 
market during the last peak of the world’s business cycle in 2004 at the latest and, 
thus, are already in the US market. Hence, regarding the euro’s appreciation, the 
market situation is currently such that German firms are currently prevented from exit 
rather than prevented from entry by sunk costs. Since significant sunk costs are 
usually associated with entry into each new export market, we would expect to see a 
high level of persistence in the firms’ export activities on the US destination markets. 
Price-setting of German exporting firms 
Research in general has shown that German export prices display a weakening of 
cost pass-through and a strengthening of pricing-to-market. The results indicate that 
the price pick-up of German export goods compared with competitors’ products in 
foreign markets resulting from an appreciation of the domestic currency has been 
smaller since German unification than it was in the 1980s. This implies that a 
permanently strong euro is being absorbed more through a reduction in the profit 
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margin, thus at least temporarily lowering the return on capital. This will be especially 
valid for the German automobile and machinery sector. Enterprises are evidently now 
keener to avoid losses in sales volume following currency appreciation (and, thus, 
prefer an only weak reaction of export volumes) than they were in the 1980s. 
Tougher international competition in the wake of ongoing globalization, the 
establishment of the euro area or EU enlargement, but also advances in productivity 
and the deregulation of product and labor markets and the clearer prioritising of price 
stability by central banks worldwide, which pushed down inflation expectations, might 
be potential reasons for the reduced price-setting range of German firms (Deutsche 
Bundesbank 2008, pp. 44f.). Firms cannot roll over a permanent appreciation of the 
euro on to prices. On the whole, export prices calculated in euro, as a weighted 
average of all export sectors, are adjusted to include only around one-eighth of each 
respective change in exchange rates (Stahn 2007). 
Overall assessment 
Seen on the whole, we feel legitimized to argue that there are some sectors in which 
German exporters should display only a weak reaction to movements in the 
exchange rate. At the same time, however, it should be clear that firms are 
heterogeneous in their ability to withstand an adverse development of the exchange 
rate for a while. What is more, if there is a permanent upward trend in the external 
value of the euro, there will be a threshold exchange rate which will induce exporters 
in all sectors of the German economy to react strongly with reductions in exports. 
This is partly because whether or not firms will tolerate and will be able to cope with 
reduced export revenues owing to currency appreciation depends, among other 
things, on whether they see the shifts in exchange rates as being temporary or 
permanent.  
What do these considerations imply for the future German export perspectives? 
Traditionally, experts make heavy weather of answering this type of question. It has 
become a stylized fact that different sectors of the economy are to a different degree 
sensitive to exchange rate movements, depending on their export shares and shares 
of imported raw materials and intermediates. It is also quite sure that the threshold 
has been steadily increasing in the recent years. While there was some talk of 
around 1.30 dollar per euro for some time, in the meantime many German exporters 
start to lament not until around 1.45 dollar per euro is reached. In the following, we 
try explain why this is so. For this purpose, let us now turn to our model of hysteresis 
in exports.  
3. HYSTERESIS IN EXPORTS 
3.1 The emergence of a ‘band of inaction’ from a microeconomic perspective 
Hysteresis in foreign trade generally occurs if sunk market-entry costs exist (Baldwin 
1989, 1990). Potentially exporting firms must expend market-entry investments, e.g. 
in setting up a distribution and service network or for introductory sales promotion, in 
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order to sell in the export market. These expenses are firm-specific and cannot be 
recovered if the firm later wants to leave the market; i.e. the entry costs are sunk. If 
the prices on the export market do not change in proportion to the exchange rate, the 
exporting firms have to bear revenue changes in their home currency when the 
exchange rate alters. If the foreign currency appreciates (i.e. the home currency 
depreciates), a market entry may become profitable, namely under consideration of 
the sunk entry costs.  
After a firm has entered the export market, the foreign currency may again 
depreciate. However, as long as the variable costs are covered, once in the market, it 
is still profitable for the firm to sell. A previous entry is not fully reversed due to entry 
costs which have to be considered as sunk ex post. Analogous effects would result in 
the case of sunk exit costs. The resulting reaction pattern to exchange rate changes 
for a single exporting firm h is depicted in Figure 2.  
Figure 2 –  Discontinuous micro hysteresis loop: export activity of a single 
firm h 
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The exchange rate x is defined as the home currency price of foreign exchange. An 
exchange rate xc exactly compensates for the variable unit costs of the firm. A 
devaluation (i.e. an increase of e) increases the unit revenues finally changed back 
into the exporters home currency. Since the sunk entry costs must be covered, a 
market entry requires an entry exchange rate xin which exceeds the variable costs 
(xc). A previously active firm will exit if the losses are larger than the sunk exit costs. 
Hence the exit trigger xout must be located below xc. Seen on the whole, thus, the 
entry and the exit triggers generally differ in a situation with sunk entry and exit costs. 
The microeconomic path-dependence occurs discontinuously if entry or exit trigger 
rates are passed.
7
 Combining both triggers results in a 'band of inaction'. Inside this 
                                            
7
 According to Krasnosel'skii and Pokrovskii (1989), p. 263, this pattern corresponds to a 
so-called “non-ideal relay”. 
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band, the current exchange rate does not unambiguously determine the current state 
of the firm's activity.  
Uncertainty, e.g. about the future exchange rate, reinforces the hysteresis 
characteristics via option value effects.
8
 Since an exit will destroy the market entry 
investments, an exporting firm may stay when the home currency devalues even if it 
is currently losing money. If the devaluation would prove to be only transitory, an 
immediate exit could turn out to be a mistake. Hence, under uncertainty the 
opportunity of a "wait-and-see"-strategy shifts the exit trigger to the left. Analogously 
waiting with an entry in a situation with uncertainty shifts the entry trigger to the right. 
Thus, the “band of inaction” is widened by uncertainty.  
Exchange rate changes will result in substantial home currency revenue changes of 
the exporting firm if the price elasticity of demand in the export market is high. By 
implication, for a low price elasticity of demand exchange rate changes do not result 
in severe unit revenue changes. Thus, the band-of-inaction will be the wider, the 
lower is the demand elasticity, higher is the value of the sunk entry and exit costs and 
the higher is the uncertainty about the future situation of the exporter. 
On a microeconomic level hysteresis occurs via a band of inaction, i.e. differences 
between both trigger/thresholds. Belke and Goecke (2005) focus on the shape and 
the location of a macroeconomic hysteresis loop, i.e. the problem of aggregation.
9
 
Aggregation is not trivial if heterogeneity regarding the value of sunk exit/entry costs 
and/or the level of uncertainty about future market situation and/or the elasticity of 
demand exist, i.e. if the entry and exit trigger rates are different for different exporting 
firms. In this (realistic) case of heterogeneity the transition from the micro to the 
macro level leads to a change of the hysteresis characteristics: the aggregate 
hysteresis loop shows no discontinuities (as known from magnetics). However, a 
pattern not very different to a “band of inaction” is remaining.  
Belke and Goecke (2005) show that even the macro behavior can be characterized 
by areas of weak reactions which are – corresponding to mechanical play – called 
“play”-area.
10
 Persistent aggregate (export) effects do not result from small changes 
in the forcing (exchange rate) variables, as far as the changes occur inside a play 
area. However, if changes go beyond the play area, sudden strong reactions (and 
                                            
8
 For a comprehensive treatment of uncertainty effects see Dixit, Pindyck (1994). For an 
empirical application to trade see, based on macro time series, Parsley and Wei (1993) 
and Roberts and Tybout (1997) and Campa (2004) who work with micro panel data. 
9
 For an adequate aggregation procedure of micro to macro hysteresis see Amable et al. 
(1991), Cross (1994), and Belke and Goecke (2005). 
10
 For play hysteresis, see Krasnosel'skii and Pokrovskii (1989), pp. 6 ff. See Goecke 
(2002) for different phenotypes of hysteresis. 
When Does It Hurt? The Exchange Rate “Pain Threshold” for German Exports 
14 
persistence effects) of the output variable (i.e. exports) occur.
11
 The specific 
realization of the exchange rate reached instantly after the complete passing of the 
play area can be denoted as a “pain threshold”, since, passing this rate, the reaction 
of exports to changes in the exchange rate becomes much stronger. However, play-
hysteresis is in two aspects different to the micro-loop. First, as mentioned the play-
loop shows no discontinuities. Second, analogous to the play in mechanics (e.g. 
when steering a car) the play area is shifted with the history of the forcing variable 
(exchange rate): Every change in the movement of the forcing variable starts with 
traversing a play area. Not until the play is passed, a spurt reaction will result, if the 
forcing variable continues move in the same direction. 
In the following section, a straightforward empirical framework to test for a play-type 
impact of the exchange rate on exports is presented. We use an algorithm developed 
in Belke and Goecke (2001) describing play-hysteresis and implement it into a 
regression framework. 
4. AN EMPIRICAL MODEL OF PLAY-HYSTERESIS 
4.1 A linear approximation of exchange rate impacts on exports 
In order to convey an impression of the simplified linearized play-dynamics – as 
theoretically developed by Belke and Goecke (2001, 2005) and described briefly in 
the introduction – we first illustrate the implications based on the interpretation of 
Figure 3. Here, we assume a constant width p of the play area to simplify issues. We 
start with an initial situation in point A (x0) located on the upward leading (right) spurt 
line, a decrease in the forcing variable x results in entering the play area. A weak 
'play' reaction results until the entire play area p is passed. The downward leading 
spurt line starts in point G with x5 (with: p = x0 – x5). In the play area only a weak 
reaction of the dependent variable y follows from changes in x. A further decrease of 
x would induce a strong response of y along the (left) downward leading spurt line.  
Alternatively, one may think of an increase in x staring from x0 (A) up to x1 (point B) 
and a subsequent decrease to x2 (C). The corresponding reaction of y initially 
evolves along the right spurt line. With an increase along the spurt line from A → B 
the relevant play area is vertically shifted upward from line GA to line DB (p = x1 – x3). 
The decrease from x2 (C) to x3 (D) again takes place in a play area.
12
 This play area 
is penetrated by an extent 'a' which is explicitly depicted. Consider next a decrease 
x2 → x3 → x4 (C → D → E). After having passed the entire play p in point D (x3), a 
strong reaction on the downward leading (left) spurt line up to point E results. In this 
                                            
11
 For a empirical macro analysis of 'spurts' in investment implicitly based on micro-
threshold models see Darby et al. (1999). See Pindyck (1988), pp. 980 f., Dixit and 
Pindyck (1994), pp. 15 f., for a non-technical description of 'spurts' based on a 
microeconomic sunk cost mechanism. 
12
 In the case of 'mechanical play' there even would not be any reaction of y inside the 
play area. See Krasnosel'skii and Pokrovskii (1989), p. 8. 
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situation, a decrease (i.e. a devaluation of the foreign currency) suddenly leads to a 
strong decrease of the exports. Thus, x3 is a kind of “pain threshold”. However, this 
“pain threshold” is not a constant trigger level as in the micro (“relais”) loop, but path-
dependent, since the play lines are vertically shifted by movements along the spurt 
lines. The play area is shifted in the opposite direction as before, so that for a 
subsequent increase again to x3 (F) the reaction is described by line EF. 
Figure 3 –  Linear play-hysteresis and spurt areas 
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4.2 An algorithm capturing linear play 
In the following, we present a hybrid version of a play algorithm which was originally 
developed by Belke and Goecke (2001, 2005) for the analysis of employment 
hysteresis and finally adapt it to our main research question, i.e. the identification of 
an exchange rate “pain threshold” for German exports. The change in the forcing 
variable x (Δx) may occur either inside the play area p inducing a weak reaction or on 
a spurt line resulting in a strong reaction of the dependent variable y (Δy). The 
movement of x inside the play area is Δa (and cumulated as a) and analogously the 
movement in the spurt area is Δs. We start with a special case, when Δx enters a 
play area. Let this change be denoted as Δxsj . according to Figure 3 this corresponds 
to the trajectory B → C → E. In the past the movement of x has led to j changes 
between the left and the right spurt line. The new change Δxsj  may enter the play area 
to an extent of Δaj or even pass the entire play p and enter the opposite spurt line by 
the fraction Δsj. Due to starting from a spurt line the cumulated movement inside the 
play area aj equals the change Δaj. The trajectory B → C in Figure 3 might serve as 
an illustration of the distance “a”. These considerations are usefully summarized by 
the formal expression: 
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(1) Δxsj  = aj + Δsj  with:  Δsj = ⎩⎨
⎧ sign(Δxsj ) ⋅ (|Δxsj | – p)   if   (|Δxsj | – p) > 0
 0   else
 
The change in the independent variable y (Δy) induced by Δxsj  is composed of the 
weak play reaction (B → C) and – by occasion – additionally of a strong spurt reaction 
(D → E). Let the parameter α denote the weak play and (α + β) the strong spurt 
reaction: 
(2) Δysj  = α ⋅ aj + (α + β) ⋅ Δsj  with:  |α| < |α + β| 
The play line is shifted vertically by spurt movements. The cumulated vertical 
displacement Vj–1 of the relevant play line as a result of all previous movements on 
both spurt lines is:  
(3) Vj–1 = β ⋅ 
⎣⎢
⎢⎡
⎦⎥
⎥⎤∑
i=0
j–1
 Δsi  = β ⋅ sj–1  with:  sj–1 ≡ ∑
i=0
j–1
 Δsi 
The dependent variable is determined by the shift V induced by past spurts and the 
current reaction Δysj : 
(4) yj = C* + Vj–1 + Δysj= C* + β ⋅ ∑
i=0
j–1
 Δsi + α ⋅ aj + (α + β) ⋅ Δsj 
   ⇒ yj = C* + β ⋅ ∑
i=0
j
 Δsi + α ⋅ Δxsj  
   ⇒ yj = C* – α ⋅ ∑
i=0
j–1
 Δxi + β ⋅ ∑
i=0
j
 Δsi + α ⋅ ( ∑
i=0
j–1
 Δxi + Δxsj ) with:  C ≡ C* – α ⋅ ∑
i=0
j–1
 Δxi 
   ⇒ yj = C + α ⋅ xj + β ⋅ sj 
Figure 4 conveys an impression of the transformations of equation (4). As a result, 
the play hysteresis loop is captured by a simple linear equation based on an artificial 
variable sj. The spurt variable sj summarizes all preceding and present spurt 
movements leading to a shift of the current relation between x and y. 
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Figure 4 – Shift of the play-lines by past spurts and the current reaction Δysj  
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Of course, an accumulation by means of an an index j describing the past changes 
between the spurt lines can be substituted by an accumulation over an explicit time 
index t. Additional non-hysteretic regressors (e.g. zt) may be included to arrive at a 
suitably generalized presentation of the hysteretic process:
13
 
(5) yt = C* + β ⋅ ∑
k=0
t
 Δst + α ⋅ Δxt + λ ⋅ zt 
   ⇒ yt = C + α ⋅ xt + β ⋅ st + λ ⋅ zt. 
5. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 
The hypothesis of hysteresis in foreign trade was initially tested by Baldwin (1990) 
and Krugman and Baldwin (1987) based on macroeconomic time series for the U.S. 
economy by employing dummy variables associated with periods of exchange rate 
appreciation. Parsley and Wei (1993) came up with empirical models that try to 
capture the asymmetric effect of real exchange rate fluctuations and real exchange 
rate volatility on the imported quantities. However, they cast doubt on the validity of 
the hysteresis hypothesis as an explanation of the persistent U.S. trade deficits in the 
1980s. Based on micro firm level data, and thus with a focus on the discontinous 
micro-hysteresis (however, emphasizing the heterogeneity of firms) Roberts and 
Tybout (1997) and Campa (2004) discovered sunk cost hysteresis to be an important 
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 For a detailed description of the algorithm calculating the artificial spurt variable st and 
for the implementation into an EVIEWS-batch program see Belke and Goecke (2001). 
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factor in determining export market participation. Agur (2003) has found empirical 
evidence of structural breaks in the exchange rate import volume relation as a 
consequence of exchange rate extrema. Using a threshold cointegration model of 
Brazilian sectoral foreign trade data, Kannebley (2008) was able to identify an 
asymmetric (i.e. hysteretic) adjustment in 9 of 16 sectors. 
Compared to existing studies of hysteresis in foreign trade, our approach is closer to 
the original concept of a macroeconomic „hysteresis loop“, since (i) it is not based on 
the discontinuous non-ideal relay interpretation as in the microeconomic firm level 
case and since (ii) the path-dependent structural breaks in the macroeconomic 
relations are not added to the system as an exogenous information. On the contrary, 
in our approach the structural shifts are explicitly determined by the history of the 
exchange rate and the exports and are simultaneously estimated together with the 
(path dependent) relation of exports to the exchange rate. 
5.1 Data and variables 
In order to check for the empirical relevance of the hysteresis model for German 
exports, we now estimate equation (5) which generalizes hysteretic behavior of 
exports dependent on movements in the exchange rate. In our empirical application, 
we use German exports to the US as the dependent variable both at the aggregated 
level and disaggregated by product groups (SITC) and the $/€ exchange rate as the 
hysteretic input variable. To be parsimonious as possible, we employ foreign real 
GDP, a linear trend and seasonal dummies as additional non-hysteretic explaining 
variables.  
The exact definitions of the time series used are as follows. Nominal exports to the 
US are denoted in current € and taken from the Eurostat database. Our export series 
is deflated by means of the PPI taken from the OECD (Main Economic Indicators) 
database. Exchange rates are spot rates as documented by WM/Reuters and are 
deflated with the above mentioned PPI indices. The real GDP time series is also 
extracted from the Eurostat database. Our estimation period ranges from 1995Q1 to 
2008Q4.  
5.2 Characteristics of the regression model 
The 'play' regression model displays the following characteristics: It is based on linear 
segments, where adjacent sections are linked (by so called 'knots', in Figure 3 these 
knots are e.g. points B, D, E in the case of the input path x1 → x3 → x4.). The position 
of the linear partial function and the transition between the sections is determined by 
the past path of an input variable x. The model is a special case of a switching 
regression setting, since adjacent sections are joined.
14
 The positions of the knots 
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 For linear spline functions and linear switching regressions see Poirier (1976), p. 9 and 
p. 117. 
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are a-priori unknown and depend on the magnitude of the play area p, which has to 
be estimated by us. The knots divide the relation between x and y into sections with 
two different slopes (for β ≠ 0). The number of parameters describing the complex 
dynamic is low: only the basic slope α, the slope difference β and the play width p are 
to be determined.  
We suppose that the standard regression model assumptions hold: the error term is 
independently, identically and normally distributed with a constant finite variance over 
all sections, and the regressors are measured without any error and are not 
correlated with the error term.  
Our model is non-linear in its parameters, since the knots are not known a-priori and 
since the play width p has to be estimated in order to determine the spurt variable s. 
The assumptions regarding the error term and the regressors guarantee that the 
OLS-estimators are best linear unbiased estimators (BLUE) in a standard regression 
model and allow the OLS-estimator to be regarded as a maximum likelihood 
estimator. If the knots are a-priori unknown, discontinuities and local maxima in the 
likelihood function result. However, if the adjacent sections are joined in a switching 
regression models the OLS-/ML-estimator leads to consistent and asymptotically 
normally distributed estimates.  
However, the finite sample properties of the play regression model remain 
problematic: The parameter estimates are not even approximately normally 
distributed for small samples and local maxima in the likelihood function may occur.
15
 
Moreover, the assumptions of the standard regression model may not be fulfilled. For 
example non-stationary variables might imply non-finite variances. Furthermore, the 
play dynamic represents a mixture of the short-term and the long-term dynamics, 
which obstructs the application of standard cointegration analysis. Unfortunately, we 
are not aware of any technique which is directly applicable to our specific model and 
therefore delivers the distributions and the respective critical values of the relevant 
estimators. Thus, any solution to these problems is clearly beyond the scope of this 
paper. 
We are now endowed with the necessary equipment to conduct an empirical 
application to German exports to the US of the play regression model. In accordance 
with section 2, we call the $/€ exchange rate value at which a transition from a play to 
a spurt reaction of aggregate German US-exports occurs a „pain threshold“. The 
empirical identification of these path-dependent switching thresholds must of course 
been seen with the necessary caution, due to the above mentioned imponderabilities 
with respect to inference. 
We apply our algorithm to estimate the play-hysteretic model by minimizing the 
residual sum of squares i.e. by the OLS-method. For this purpose, we enact a grid 
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 See Hujer (1986), pp. 231 ff., Poirier (1976), pp. 108 ff., pp. 117 ff. and p. 129, Hudson 
(1966) and Hinkley (1969) for the small sample properties of the ML- (OLS-) estimates 
in a model with unknown but continuous switches. 
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search over the width of a time invariant play parameter pt = p = γ. For every given 
point of the γ-grid the algorithm "recognize" the switches and for the given γ the spurt 
variable s is computed from the actual input (exchange rate) series. The size of γ is 
predetermined for each grid point. The respective OLS-estimation of α and β for each 
grid point is straightforward since s enters the regression equation (5) in a linear way. 
The final OLS-estimate of the play parameter is determined by choosing from the grid 
the γ-value with the minimum of the residual sum of squares (i.e. the maximum of the 
R-squared). 
5.3 Hypotheses 
In order to derive the hypotheses to be tested, we have to take into account that the 
width of the play pt was not addressed up to now. In a simple case pt is defined as a 
constant parameter, i.e. a time-invariant width of the play area  pt = p = γ , which has 
to be estimated. According to our description of the play dynamics in section 3, the 
relevant hypotheses to be tested must refer to the equations:
16
  
(5') yt = C + α ⋅ xt + β ⋅ st(γ) + λ ⋅ zt     with:  |α| < |α + β| 
(6) pt = γ     with:  γ ≥ 0. 
If we want to check whether play is relevant at all, we have to test the hypothesis 
(H1) β ≠ 0 against the alternative β = 0. According to Belke and Goecke (2001, 2005), 
the hypothesis to be tested might even be more restrictive, since a weaker play and a 
stronger spurt reaction (both with the same sign) are assumed as the “typical” 
hysteresis pattern.  
If one (for the moment) neglects possible limitations on inference resulting from, for 
instance, non-finite variances of the variables, the OLS-estimates of the respective 
equations can – according to section 4 – be regarded as asymptotically unbiased (i.e. 
consistent) and asymptotically normally distributed. However, since the small sample 
properties remain problematic we refrain from further conclusions concerning exact 
inference and for the moment only convey a broad-brush view of the basic pattern of 
the results. Therefore, the following regression results serve more as a first 
illustration of the working of our algorithm and the main direction of results rather 
than a basis for exact inference. While there is evidence that our OLS approach is 
quite robust, we leave the latter task for future research. 
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 However, it appears to be quite straightforward how to generalize the model in a way 
where the play width pt is not constant and determined by other variables. For instance, 
the higher an uncertainty variable ut is, the more important are option value effects of 
waiting, and thus the play area is expected to widen. See eq. (12) in the appendix for 
this generalization. 
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5.5 Empirical results 
Evidence for total exports 
As a baseline we start with a standard regression of German total exports on the US 
on the PPP adjusted (PPI) $/€ exchange rate (RER) excluding play or spurt effects. 
In terms of the play model, thus, the restriction β = 0 is applied. We display the 
corresponding results in Table 1.  
Table 1 –  Standard regression without play / spurt (restriction β = 0) 
Dependent Variable: total German Exports to the USA  
Method: Least Squares   
Sample: 1995Q1 2008Q4   
Included observations: 56   
 Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.  
C 8529.546 2809.039 3.036464 0.0038
RER -8460.892 971.8874 -8.705630 0.0000
US-GDP(-1) 17.76498 4.674016 3.800795 0.0004
D1 -326.4904 326.3298 -1.000492 0.3220
D2 -417.7190 324.2338 -1.288327 0.2037
D3 -399.7934 324.1422 -1.233389 0.2233
TREND -186.2570 94.28472 -1.975474 0.0539
R-squared 0.946960     Mean dependent var 14878.20
Adjusted R-squared 0.940466     S.D. dependent var 3512.028
S.E. of regression 856.9225     Akaike info criterion 16.46104
Sum squared resid 35981496     Schwarz criterion 16.71421
Log likelihood -453.9091     Hannan-Quinn criter. 16.55919
F-statistic 145.8062     Durbin-Watson stat 1.123707
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
 
All variables are (according to the empirical realizations of the t-statistics) highly 
significant and display the theoretically expected sign. The US GDP variable enters 
with a lag of one quarter (best fit for lagged data and to avoid problems of reverse 
causation) whereas the real $/€ exchange rate is considered contemporaneously 
(otherwise J-curve-effects might occur which might severely interfere with the 
hysteretic sub-system).  
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As a next step, we conduct a one-dimensional grid search in order to estimate γ for 
the simple case with constant play (see Figure 5). The sequence of R² dependent on 
different realizations of γ shows an absolute maximum at γ = 0.24 with an R² = 
0.967891. The minimum of the R² plot at the realization γ = 0 (R² = 0.946960) exactly 
corresponds to the R-squared of the standard model as stated in Table 1. The 
respective OLS-estimates of the spurt/play regression with an artificial spurt-variable 
(SPURT) based on this constant width p = γ = 0.24 of the play area is presented in 
Table 2. 
Figure 5 –  R² resulting from a one-dimensional grid search with constant 
play over γ 
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Table 2 –  Regression with constant play p = γ = 0.24 
Dependent Variable: total German Exports to the USA  
Method: Least Squares   
Sample: 1995Q1 2008Q4   
Included observations: 56   
 Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.  
C 9658.763 2217.468 4.355762 0.0001
RER -2574.477 1300.446 -1.979688 0.0535
SPURT -9385.067 1677.813 -5.593632 0.0000
US-GDP(-1) 18.51232 3.676795 5.034907 0.0000
D1 -417.7233 257.0544 -1.625038 0.1107
D2 -440.4651 254.9211 -1.727849 0.0904
D3 -424.5425 254.8551 -1.665819 0.1023
TREND -227.2783 74.48162 -3.051469 0.0037
R-squared 0.967891     Mean dependent var 14878.20
Adjusted R-squared 0.963208     S.D. dependent var 3512.028
S.E. of regression 673.6494     Akaike info criterion 15.99486
Sum squared resid 21782566     Schwarz criterion 16.28420
Log likelihood -439.8561     Hannan-Quinn criter. 16.10704
F-statistic 206.6993     Durbin-Watson stat 1.637163
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
 
Again, all estimated coefficients display the theoretically expected sign. Note that the 
spurt-variable seems to substitute the effects of original the real $/€ exchange rate. 
With respect to the hypothesis (H1) β ≠ 0 the estimated coefficient of the spurt 
variable is β = – 9385.067 with an empirical realization of the t-value of – 5.59. 
However, since the small sample properties of our regression model are still basically 
unknown, the t-values are most probably not student-t-distributed. Nevertheless, it 
seems fair to say that this high empirical t-realization (which is about three times as 
high as the 5% critical value in the case of the standard student-t-distribution) 
represents a strong hint at the relevance of play. 
Figure 6 finally conveys a graphical impression of the time sequence of the artificial 
variables SPURT (right scale) which captures the strong impact of further exchange 
rate changes after passing through the play area (i.e. after passing a kind of “pain 
threshold”) and of the original real $/€ exchange rate (RER, left scale). Spurt was 
calculated based on the estimated play width p=γ =24. The path of the spurt variable 
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across time shows of course similarities to the original RER path. However, periods 
of inaction exhibiting no variation of the spurt variable due to play effects also 
emerge. Expressed differently, short-term variability in the real exchange rate series 
is filtered via the play/spurt algorithm. Only large changes in the RER are mirrored by 
the spurt series. 
Figure 6 –  Real exchange rate and the resulting spurt variable (γ =24) 
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If the spurt variable undergoes some changes, this simultaneously shifts the borders 
of the play area. The up to now most recent shift of this border corresponds to the 
exchange rate extremum reached in 2007/2008. Thus, this upper bound exchange 
rate of the play area should be still valid today, i.e. at the time this paper has been 
written. To be more specific, it is equivalent to the last RER maximum of our quarterly 
series and amounts to about 1.55 US dollar per euro in terms of the nominal 
exchange rate. We interpret this figure as the current “pain threshold”, where a strong 
spurt reaction of the export to a further appreciation of the euro is expected to start 
again. What is more, this point estimate is also identical with today’s value, i.e. in late 
October 2009, although it is derived from the data and estimations available at the 
end of our estimation period (December 2008). The reason is that no comparable 
exchange rate maximum which could have shifted the play area and thus the “pain 
threshold” has occurred in the meantime from January to October 2009. 
Since we abstract from exchange rate volatility and, thus, calculate a constant play, 
we have been able to specify an upper border of the play based on an inspection of 
the previous exchange rate path. In our case, the latter corresponds with the 
absolute maximum of the exchange rate reached in 2008. Although in 2009 the euro 
(slightly) depreciated again for some time, this play has remained valid throughout 
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2009. The devaluation of the euro was too small to wipe out the effect of the previous 
maximum of the $/€ exchange rate. In addition, we would like to point at the fact that 
inflation was – not at least due to the financial crisis and its transatlantic spillovers – 
moderate and nearly the same on both sides of the Atlantic since the start-of-year 
until today. Hence, inference with respect to the nominal $/€ exchange rate by and 
large corresponds with inference with respect to the real exchange rate. 
Due to option value effects the path-dependent hysteresis effects will be the more 
important and, technically speaking the play area will be the wider, the more 
uncertain the economic environment is for the exporting firms. Vast uncertainty 
related to the financial crisis was highly important in 2008, but was substantially 
reduced in the meantime. Economic and financial uncertainty is now still slightly but 
steadily falling, at least according to all indicators of the financial fear factor as the 
DAX volatility index (VDAX) and the implied volatility on the S&P100. Obviously, the 
global policy response to the financial and economic crisis has calmed stock markets 
‘as the fears of an economic Armageddon have subsided’. Also political uncertainty 
has dropped after many world leaders had clarified the details of their stimulus 
packages (Bloem and Floetotto 2009). However, we did not explicitly incorporate 
uncertainty variables and correspondingly a time-variable play width in our spurt 
regression. Therefore, our estimation of the play width and thus the estimation of the 
“pain threshold” may be interpreted as a kind of a “maximum” estimate of the play 
width and of the upper border of the play area (interpreted as a “pain threshold”). 
Corrected for the reduction of uncertainty, the current threshold may even take a 
value below 1.55 $/€. 
Evidence on the sectoral level 
Since sunk costs, uncertainty effects and the market structure are different for 
specific branches, we expect differences in the play-width for different sectors. 
Strikingly, the overall empirical pattern continues to hold if we use German exports 
disaggregated by commodities (SITC-Groups) and conduct the same regression 
exercises once again. For instance, we find a slightly higher play γ = 0.25 for the 
SITC-Group 7 consisting of machinery and transport equipment. 63% of the German 
Exports to the US (in the average of the period from 1995-2009) consist of goods 
from this SITC-Group. The quite detailed results stemming from this exercise can be 
found in Table 3, Table 4 and Figure 7. 
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Table 3 – Standard regression without play / spurt (restriction β = 0) German 
Export to USA SITC-Group 7 (Machinery and transport equipment) 
Dependent Variable: German Exports to USA SITC 7  
Method: Least Squares   
Sample: 1995Q1 2008Q4   
Included observations: 56   
 Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.  
C 9078.931 2342.025 3.876530 0.0003
RER -7185.570 810.3073 -8.867709 0.0000
US-GDP(-1) 10.61871 3.896943 2.724883 0.0089
D1 -297.9861 272.0762 -1.095230 0.2788
D2 -502.5581 270.3286 -1.859064 0.0690
D3 -602.8220 270.2523 -2.230590 0.0303
TREND -114.7852 78.60952 -1.460194 0.1506
R-squared 0.915305     Mean dependent var 9512.007
Adjusted R-squared 0.904934     S.D. dependent var 2317.200
S.E. of regression 714.4558     Akaike info criterion 16.09739
Sum squared resid 25011910     Schwarz criterion 16.35056
Log likelihood -443.7269     Hannan-Quinn criter. 16.19554
F-statistic 88.25789     Durbin-Watson stat 0.929366
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
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Table 4 – Regression with constant play  p = γ = 0.25 (German Export to USA 
SITC-Group 7) 
Dependent Variable: German Exports to USA SITC 7  
Method: Least Squares   
Sample: 1995Q1 2008Q4   
Included observations: 56   
 Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.  
C 10599.61 1649.952 6.424195 0.0000
RER -1793.115 935.9492 -1.915825 0.0614
SPURT -8908.247 1231.151 -7.235703 0.0000
US-GDP(-1) 11.35980 2.724951 4.168810 0.0001
D1 -374.4015 190.4089 -1.966302 0.0551
D2 -527.4124 188.9259 -2.791636 0.0075
D3 -629.4185 188.8771 -3.332424 0.0017
TREND -155.7742 55.22047 -2.820951 0.0069
R-squared 0.959490     Mean dependent var 9512.007
Adjusted R-squared 0.953583     S.D. dependent var 2317.200
S.E. of regression 499.2327     Akaike info criterion 15.39559
Sum squared resid 11963199     Schwarz criterion 15.68492
Log likelihood -423.0764     Hannan-Quinn criter. 15.50776
F-statistic 162.4150     Durbin-Watson stat 1.619534
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
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Figure 7 –  R² resulting from a one-dimensional grid search with constant 
play over γ 
German Export to USA SITC-Group 7 with an maximum R²=0.959490 by 
play=γ=0.25 
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For the SITC-Subgroup 78 (Road vehicles including air-cushion vehicles) we able to 
identify a play of γ = 0.23. These goods cover on average 26% of the German exports 
to the USA over the observed period. We present the corresponding results in Table 
5, Table 6 and Figure 8. 
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Table 5 –  Standard regression without play / spurt (restriction β = 0), German 
Export to USA SITC-Group 78 (Road vehicles -including air-cushion 
vehicles) 
Dependent Variable: German Exports to USA SITC 78  
Method: Least Squares   
Sample: 1995Q1 2008Q4   
Included observations: 56   
 Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.  
C 1071.942 1786.412 0.600053 0.5512
RER -3566.143 618.0731 -5.769775 0.0000
US-GDP(-1) 2.808519 2.972447 0.944851 0.3494
D1 -165.3654 207.5299 -0.796827 0.4294
D2 -411.4928 206.1969 -1.995630 0.0515
D3 -651.0405 206.1387 -3.158265 0.0027
TREND 0.156824 59.96050 0.002615 0.9979
R-squared 0.839841     Mean dependent var 4079.398
Adjusted R-squared 0.820230     S.D. dependent var 1285.308
S.E. of regression 544.9611     Akaike info criterion 15.55577
Sum squared resid 14552147     Schwarz criterion 15.80894
Log likelihood -428.5617     Hannan-Quinn criter. 15.65393
F-statistic 42.82447     Durbin-Watson stat 0.620867
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
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Table 6 –  Regression with constant play  p = γ = 0.23 (German Export to USA 
SITC-Group 78) 
Dependent Variable: German Exports to USA SITC 78  
Method: Least Squares   
Sample: 1995Q1 2008Q4   
Included observations: 56   
 Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.  
C 1533.249 1310.301 1.170150 0.2477
RER 715.3072 792.3940 0.902716 0.3712
SPURT -6596.096 1001.942 -6.583311 0.0000
US-GDP(-1) 3.310292 2.178451 1.519563 0.1352
D1 -237.0261 152.3909 -1.555382 0.1264
D2 -425.0628 151.0394 -2.814251 0.0071
D3 -666.1360 151.0001 -4.411494 0.0001
TREND -27.15483 44.11253 -0.615581 0.5411
R-squared 0.915835     Mean dependent var 4079.398
Adjusted R-squared 0.903561     S.D. dependent var 1285.308
S.E. of regression 399.1472     Akaike info criterion 14.94810
Sum squared resid 7647287.     Schwarz criterion 15.23744
Log likelihood -410.5468     Hannan-Quinn criter. 15.06028
F-statistic 74.61567     Durbin-Watson stat 0.988597
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
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Figure 8 –  R² resulting from a one-dimensional grid search with constant 
play over γ (German Export to USA SITC-Group 78 with an 
maximum R²=0.915835 by play=γ=0.23) 
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Since the two sectors explicitly covered by us represent about three quarters of the 
German exports to the US, it turns out that the play of both groups of goods taken 
together nearly completely drives the play for the exports. Due to high market-entry 
cost emerging especially in the machinery and automobile branches, it is not 
surprising that we could find the best fit of a play-spurt dynamics especially for these 
goods. As expected play-spurt dynamics are not important in sectors with 
homogenous goods where sunk market entry costs are negligible, we did not find any 
plausible play for the commodity groups 1 to 6 (SITC, the respective regression 
results are not explicitly stated in this paper). 
6. CONCLUSIONS 
The paper deals with the impact of the exchange rate on the relationship among 
German exports and its main determinants. Our main aim has been to identify an 
exchange rate „pain threshold“ for German exporters. We rely on a nonlinear path-
dependent model in which suddenly strong spurts of exports occur when changes of 
the exchange rate go beyond a so called “play area” (which is similar to the 
phenotype of play in mechanics). We capture this on-linear dynamics in a simplified 
linearized way and implement an algorithm describing linear play hysteresis into a 
suitable regression framework. Our non-linear model including play displays a much 
better performance than the standard linear model. Thus, the implications of some 
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hysteretic macro models concerning the dynamics of aggregate labor demand are 
corroborated empirically for trade variables as well. 
Moreover, we are able to show that the frequently mentioned notion of an exactly 
identified unique “pain threshold” of the $/€ exchange rate simply does not exist. 
Instead, we come up with an estimate of a path-dependent play area width of 24 US 
dollar cent per euro for total German exports to the US. Taking into account that the 
borders of the play area and, thus, also the „pain threshold“ (as the upper border) 
“today” depend on the historical path of the RER until “today”, the location of the play 
area and the „pain threshold“ is dependent on the observation point in time.  
For instance, at the end of our estimation period, our estimation results imply a „pain 
threshold“ of 1.55 $/€ which continued to hold in October 2009. Compared to the 
more recent laments of business German business representatives and also to the 
more recent implicit assessment by the ECB this threshold is slightly but not 
substantially higher. On October 22nd, 2009, the dollar hit the 1.50 level, implying 
that we are currently not too far away from this threshold – especially if we take into 
account that macroeconomic uncertainty has shrunk slightly but steadily since the 
turn-of-the-year 2008/09. However, laments appeared to be quite contained these 
days until very recently. The interesting question then is why this time “it was so 
different”. We feel legitimized to preliminarily argue that maybe the awareness of 
appreciation of the euro has been overlaid and dominated by the public reception of 
the economic and financial crisis. 
But as in recent episodes of local maxima of the $/€ exchange rate, also the ECB is 
also now apparently becoming increasingly aware that a stronger euro must 
absolutely be avoided. Further euro strengthening in the remainder of the year will 
have a significant impact on 2010 economic growth, for instance, in export 
dependent Germany, and make the ECB’s own pessimistic forecasts for this year 
even more probable. Hence, this may become a new era of the ECB’s rhetoric on 
exchange rates because (i) it will be the euro area which will have to bear the burden 
of the global adjustment and (ii) voting majorities in the ECB Council have changed in 
the meantime to the benefit of former weak currency countries which are inclined to 
enact central bank interventions in the FX markets in order to weaken their home 
currencies.  
What does all this lead us? If, as a result of global imbalances, the external value of 
the euro increases even further, the demand for German exports will fall dramatically 
and (units of) German firms reduce or even stop trading internationally, then re-
entrance into international trade will be severely hampered, even if the euro will 
devaluate again in the future. So, once there will be a zero entry in any export good 
category, the concern is that it is going to be hard for exporters in this goods category 
to re-establish their export nodes and get back in.
17
 A German firm may even be 
                                            
17
  For a similar argument with respect to global production networks see Godart, Goerg 
and Goerlich (2009). 
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likely to decide not to re-establish global trading networks again, or, at a minimum, it 
might take some time before it well be capable of doing so. Hence, the “ever rising 
euro” may have consequences that go well beyond the prediction of any standard 
economic model incorporating a unique exports equilibrium, when the presence of 
global trading networks and sunk costs of for German exporters is acknowledged.  
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Annex: An algorithm to calculate the spurt variable 
In the following we present a detailed algorithm in the spirit of Belke and 
Goecke (2001) to calculate the extent of the current penetration into the play 
area at and the cumulated spurts st. We define four dummy variables describing 
the current state of the system. For reasons of simplification, some special 
cases which become relevant if the change in x exactly meets the border 
between play and spurt (e.g. in point D) are not explicitly included below. 
However, these cases are taken into account in the Eviews version of the 
algorithm. 
A dummy M↓t  indicates a movement starting in a left (downward leading) spurt 
line. Analogously, M↑t  indicates a start on a right (upward leading) spurt line. 
Corresponding to Figure 3 e.g. for point E,  M↓t  = 1  holds, and for point B  M↑t  = 1  
is valid. 
(7) M↓t  = ⎩⎪
⎨⎪⎧
 1   if   Δst–1 < 0
 1   if   (Δst–1 = 0) ∧ (Δxt–1 = 0) ∧ (Δat–1 = 0)
 0   else
 
 M↑t  = ⎩⎪
⎨⎪⎧
 1   if   Δst–1 > 0
 1   if   (Δst–1 = 0) ∧ (Δxt–1 = 0) ∧ (Δat–1 = 0)
 0   else
 
Due to the path dependence, information on the current reference spurt line has 
to transmitted to subsequent periods: The dummies B↓t  and B↑t  indicate the last 
(and maybe the current) spurt line. In Figure 3 e.g. for point F,  B↓t  = 1 is valid, 
and  B↑t  = 1  holds for point C. 
(8) B↓t  = ⎩⎪
⎨⎪⎧
 1   if   Δst–1 < 0
 1   if   (Δst–1 = 0) ∧ (B↓t–1 = 1)
 0   else
 
 B↑t  = ⎩⎪
⎨⎪⎧
 1   if   Δst–1 > 0
 1   if   (Δst–1 = 0) ∧ (B↑t–1 = 1)
 0   else
                           with:  B↑t  = 1 – B↓t  
Now, we calculate the extent at to which the play area pt is penetrated. We first 
define an auxiliary variable bt. Play penetration at is calculated based on a 
comparison of bt and the play width pt. 
(9) bt = B↓t  ⋅ (1 – M↓t) ⋅ (at–1 + Δxt) + B↑t  ⋅ (1 – M↑t) ⋅ (at–1 – Δxt) 
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(10) at = 
⎩⎪
⎨⎪
⎧   bt   if   0 < bt ≤ pt
  Δxt  if   (M↓t  = 1) ∧ (Δxt > 0) ∧ (Δxt < pt)
 –Δxt   if   (M↑t  = 1) ∧ (Δxt < 0) ∧ (–Δxt < pt)
 
Finally, we define changes in the spurt variable (Δst) induced by changes in the 
input variable (Δxt): 
(11) Δst = 
⎩⎪
⎨⎪
⎧ bt ⋅ [B↓t  ⋅ (1 – M↓t ) – B↑t  ⋅ (1 – M↑t )]             if   bt < 0
 (bt – pt) ⋅ [B↓t  ⋅ (1 – M↓t ) – B↑t  ⋅ (1 – M↑t )]       if   bt > pt
 Δxt            if   [(M↓t  = 1) ∧ (Δxt < 0)] ∨ [(M↑t  = 1) ∧ (Δxt > 0)]
 Δxt – pt       if   (M↓t  = 1) ∧ (Δxt > pt)
 Δxt + pt       if   (M↑t  = 1) ∧ ((–Δxt) > pt)
 
The width of the play pt was not addressed up to now. In a simple case pt is 
defined as a constant parameter pt=p=γ witch has to be estimated. However, it 
is easy to gereralize the model in a way where the play width pt is determined 
by other variables. For instance, the higher an uncertainty variable ut is, the 
more important are option value effects of waiting, and thus the play area is 
expected to widen. In technical term this can be expressed in a simple linear 
way as a function of, e.g., an uncertainty proxy variable ut: 
(12) pt = γ + δ ⋅ ut with:  γ, δ ≥ 0  and  ut ≥ 0  ⇒  pt ≥ 0 
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Table A.1:  Implementation of the algorithm into an EVIEWS-batch 
program 
 SMPL 69.1 98.4 
 'INPUT AREA 
 GENR s_up=1   'set 1 for a maximum as an initial extremum (else 0) 
 !an = 73.3   'first estimation quarter (time of the first extremum in 
a spurt area) 
 !en = 96.1   'last estimation quarter 
 !n = 24*4+1  'number of sample point (calculated from !an to !en) 
 !g = 10  'precision of the grid search for the constant play 
component 
 !m = 0  'minimum of the grid search for the constant play component 
 !b = 20 'maximum of the grid search for the constant play component 
 !h = 10 'precision of the grid search for the variable play component 
 !y = 0  'minimum of the grid search for the variable play component 
 !v =30  'maximum of the grid search for the variable play component 
 GENR w =  WRDM   'hysteretic input variable 
 GENR u = u_wrdm  'determination of the uncertainty realisation 
 %ST11= "BAI"                                    'dependent variable  
 %ST12= "C WRDM BIP91(-2) PIOE(-4) TREND D1 D2 D3"  'independent 
variables of the regression 
 'END OF INPUT AREA 
 'INITIALISATION 
 SMPL 69.1 98.4 
 GENR dw=na 
 GENR d_spurt=na 
 GENR play=na 
 GENR spurt=na 
 GENR bs_do=na 
 GENR s_do=na 
 GENR bs_up=na 
 GENR pb=na 
 GENR pc=na 
 GENR pa=na 
 GENR punkt_do=na 
 GENR punkt_up=na 
 GENR dw=w-w(-1) 
 C=0 
 matrix(!g,!h) R_2m =0 
 matrix(!g,!h)  C_11m = 0 
 matrix(!g,!h)  C_12m = 0 
 matrix(!g,1) P_CONSTA =0 
 matrix(1,!h) P_VARIA =0 
 SMPL !an !an 
 GENR bs_up=s_up 
 GENR s_do=1-s_up 
 GENR bs_do=1-s_up 
 SMPL !an-1 !an 
 GENR pa=0 
 GENR pb=0 
 GENR pc=0 
 GENR d_spurt=0 
 GENR spurt=0 
 'END OF INITIALISATION 
 'START OF GRID SEARCH 
 FOR !0=1 TO !g    'LOOP FOR P_CONSTA 
 FOR !1=1 TO !h    'LOOP FOR P_VARIA 
 SMPL !an !en 
 GENR spurt=0 
 GENR play = !m+((!0-1)/(!g))*(!b-!m) + (!y+((!1-1)/(!h))*(!v-!y))*u 
 P_CONSTA(!0,1) = !m+((!0-1)/(!g))*(!b-!m) 
 P_VARIA(1,!1) = !y+((!1-1)/(!h))*(!v-!y) 
 IF @MIN(play)>0 THEN 
 FOR !2=1 TO !n  'LOOP FOR THE DETERMINATION OF THE SPURT VARIABLE 
 SMPL !an+!2 !an+!2 
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 GENR punkt_do=(pa(-1)=play(-1))*(pa(-1)<>0)*s_up(-1)+(pb(-1)=play(-
1))*(pb(-1)<>0)*bs_up(-1) 
 GENR punkt_up=(pa(-1)=play(-1))*(pa(-1)<>0)*s_do(-1)+(pb(-1)=play(-
1))*(pb(-1)<>0)*bs_do(-1) 
 GENR s_do=(pa(-1)<>play(-1))*(pb(-1)<>play(-1))*((d_spurt(-
1)<0)+(s_do(-1)=1)*(d_spurt(-1)=0)*((dw(-1)=0)*(pa(-1)=0))) + 
punkt_do 
 GENR s_up=(pa(-1)<>play(-1))*(pb(-1)<>play(-1))*((d_spurt(-
1)>0)+(s_up(-1)=1)*(d_spurt(-1)=0)*((dw(-1)=0)*(pa(-1)=0))) + 
punkt_up 
 GENR bs_do=(pa(-1)<>play(-1))*(pb(-1)<>play(-1))*((d_spurt(-
1)<0)+(d_spurt(-1)=0)*(bs_do(-1))) + punkt_do 
 GENR bs_up=(pa(-1)<>play(-1))*(pb(-1)<>play(-1))*((d_spurt(-
1)>0)+(d_spurt(-1)=0)*(bs_up(-1))) + punkt_up 
 GENR pb=bs_do*(1-s_do)*(pa(-1)+dw) + bs_up*(1-s_up)*(pa(-1)-dw) 
 GENR pc=s_do*(dw>0)*dw + s_up*(dw<0)*(-dw) 
 GENR pa=pc*(pc<=play) + bs_do*(1-s_do)*(pb>0)*(pb<=play)*pb + 
bs_up*(1-s_up)*(pb>0)*(pb<=play)*pb 
 GENR d_spurt=s_do*((dw<0)*dw+(dw>play)*(dw-play)) + 
s_up*((dw>0)*dw+((-dw)>play)*(dw+play)) + bs_do*(1-
s_do)*((pb<0)*pb+(pb>play)*(pb-play)) + bs_up*(1-s_up)*((pb<0)*(-
pb)+(pb>play)*(play-pb)) 
 GENR spurt=spurt(-1)+d_spurt 
 NEXT 
 ENDIF 
  c=0 
  SMPL !an !en 
  IF @MEAN(spurt)=0 THEN 
  EQUATION eq1.LS %ST11 %ST12 
  ELSE  
  EQUATION eq1.LS %ST11 spurt  %ST12        'OLS ESTIMATION 
  ENDIF 
  GENR EC = RESID 
  R_2m(!0,!1) = @R2 
  C_11m(!0,!1) = c(1) 
  C_12m(!0,!1) = c(2) 
  c=0 
  GENR RESID=na  
  GENR EC=na 
 NEXT 
 NEXT   'END OF GRID SEARCH 
 'SEARCH FOR HIGHEST R² 
  coef(2) c_und_d 
  scalar r2_max=0 
  FOR !i=1 TO !g 
   FOR !j=1 TO !h 
     IF  ( R_2m(!i,!j) > r2_max ) THEN 
     r2_max=R_2m(!i,!j) 
     c_und_d(1)=p_consta(!i,1) 
     c_und_d(2)=p_varia(1,!j) 
    ENDIF  
   NEXT 
  NEXT 
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Transcriptions: 
at = pa ;  B↓t  = bs_do ;  B↑t  = bs_up ;  bt = pb ;  M↓t  = s_do ;  M↑t  = s_up ;  pt = 
play ;  st = spurt ;  Δst = d_spurt ;  
ut = u ;  xt = w ;  Δxt = dw ;  yt = BAI ;  γ = c_und_d(1) ;  δ = c_und_d(2) . 
 
 
 
 
Comments: 
In order to apply the batch program, some information has to be delivered in the 
'INPUT AREA, since the starting point has to be characterized, due to the path 
dependence of the system. It is necessary to start in a spurt area (with either  
M↑t  = s_up = 1  or  M↓t  = s_do = 1). Therefore, the sample has to be truncated 
on occasion and in the 'INPUT AREA the variable s_up has to be set to 0 or 1. 
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